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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Inheritance By And From Illegitimnates Under
Maryland Intestacy Law
Penman v. Ayers'
The appellee, who was a legitimate brother of the
intestate claimed an exclusive right to inherit the real
and personal estate of his intestate brother. The only other
survivor was the appellant, whose claim was predicated on
his status as the illegitimate half-brother of the intestate
with the common ancestor being their mother. In affirming
the lower court's decision in favor of the appellee, the
Court of Appeals held that under Maryland intestacy
statutes, an illegitimate brother cannot inherit real and
personal property from his legitimate half brother who
had died intestate.
The Civil Law2 recognized the concubine, and its laws
were much more indulgent to bastard children than the
English Common Law, which was strongly in favor of
marriage. Under the English system the bastard was con-
sidered the son of nobody, nullius filius. This complete
bar to inheritance was ingrafted into the Common Law
of every American jurisdiction except Connecticut.'
Hence, in England, if there were no legitimate heirs, the
land escheated to the crown instead of passing to the
illegitimates. Likewise, they could have no heirs but those
of their own bodies. Collateral heirs were derived from a
common ancestor, and since at Common Law an illegiti-
mate had no legal ancestors, he could have no collateral
kindred. Hence, if he died without issue and intestate, any
land of which he was seized escheated to the lord of the
fee.4
these shares shall be the same basis that Is attributed to them
under the Federal income tax law."
Another possibility would be the deletion of the present language in
§ 279(j) and the Insertion of a clause prioviding that amounts paid in
liquidaition on dissolution of a corporation shall be treated as amounts paid
for the sale or exchange of its stock. Such an amendment would be
consistent with the theory that liquidation and sales of stock are
similar in substance and should be treated alike under the tax laws.
Other states, Including Massachusetts and Kentucky have so amended
their tax statutes. Under present Maryland law, however, an amendment
of this nature would render these distributions completely non-taxable,
because of our present policy not to tax capital gains or allow the
deduction of capital losses. Art. 81, §§ 280(a), 283(a).
1221 Md. 154, 156 A. 2d 638 (1959).
2 GAviT, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTAIIES ON THE LAW (1941), 368.
8Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 286, 91 A. 191, 194 (1914); Vernier and
Churchill, Inheritance by and from Bastards, 20 Iowa L. Rev. 216 (1935).
' Loc. cit. supra, n. 2.
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The only significant relief from the rigors and harshness
of the Common Law doctrine of nulius fihus has been the
result of remedial legislation.' While there are certain
basic similarities in the statutes, there is no uniform
scheme in the removal of the Common Law disabilities
in the American states. Under present Maryland legisla-
tion, illegitimates can inherit from their mother, each
other, and the descendants of each other;6 and they are
placed in the bloodstream of their natural parents for
purposes of inheritance if the father subsequently mar-
ries and acknowledges the child as his.'
In view of such remedial legislation, the Court of
Appeals has been faced with the problem of determining
whether the Legislature intended to include illegitimate
children within the definitions of "children" or its equiva-
lent as the word appears in various other statutes in the
Annotated Code of Maryland. In Article 93, Section 329,1
it is provided that, if the surviving spouse of a testator
elects to renounce the provisions made for his benefit by
the will, he shall take dower in the lands plus one-half of
the personal estate, so long as the testator has not left
other descendants surviving. However, he only takes
dower plus one-third if the deceased is survived by other
descendants. The testatrix's husband in Rowe v. Cullen9
renounced the will and elected to take, in lieu thereof, his
legal share in the wife's estate. His contention that the
wife's illegitimate son was not a "descendant" within the
meaning of the above statute was rejected by the Court.
In referring to the statute, the Court indicated the intent
of the legislature was unmistakable and it refused to give
the word "descendant" a forced and unnatural meaning in
order to gratify a harsh common law policy that has been
repudiated for more than a century. Following the same
general concept, the Court of Appeals in Reese v. Starner °
held that the mother of an illegitimate child was a "parent"
within the meaning of Article 93, Section 135,11 and she was
therefore entitled to share equally with the widow in the
estate of her illegitimate son.
5 Note, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimate8, 84 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 531, 540 (1936).
64 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 7.
74 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 6.
" 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 329.
9 177 Md. 357, 9 A. 2d 585 (1939).
o106 Md. 50, 66 A. 443 (1907).
"MD. CODE (1957) Art. 93, § 135, provides that if the intestate leaves
surviving a husband or widow, no child, parent, grandchild, brother, or
sister of the intestate, the surviving husband or widow, as the case may
be, shall be entitled to the whole.
19,60]
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While there are reasons for not allowing an adulterous
or unwed parent to inherit from an illegitimate child, there
seems to be no logical reason for not allowing the illegiti-
mate to share in his natural parent's estate. In the Rowe 2
case the Court indicated that the:
"... trend of the law has been to give illegitimate
children the status and privileges of legitimate chil-
dren, except where that policy would affect the per-
mance and dignity of the institution of marriage, or
the traditional rights and privileges of children born
in lawful wedlock. ' 13
In 1919, an illegitimate dependent child was denied the
right to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act
for the accidental death of her father. 4 The Court in so
holding reasoned that if the Legislature had intended
illegitimate children to receive the benefit of the statute,
it would have included them in the definition of "child"
inasmuch as it was careful to define the word to include
posthumous and adopted children. 5 Apparently as a result
of this case, the Legislature, in 1920, enacted an amend-
ment to the Workmen's Compensation Act to permit an
award for the benefit of an illegitimate child under similar
circumstances. 6 An illegitimate daughter of the de-
ceased was not allowed to maintain an action under the
Wrongful Death Statute in W. B. & A. R. Co. v. State.7
The Court indicated therein that:
"It is a rule of construction that prima facie the
word 'child' or 'children' when used in a statute, will
or deed means legitimate child or children. In other
words bastards are not within the term 'child' or
'children'."'
In the same manner as with the Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Wrongful Death Statute was amended, in 1937, to
permit an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful
death of the mother and vice versa, but significantly, no
mention was made as to recovery for the death of a father
of an illegitimate child.19
12 Supra, n. 9.
Ibid., 362.
14 Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 A. 117 (1919).
"Ibid., 350. In accord, Bell v. Terry and Tench Co., 177 App. Div. 123,
163 N.Y:S. 733 (1917).
"221 Md. 154, 160, 156 A. 2d 638 (1959).
136 Md. 103, 111 A. 164 (1920).
"Ibid., 119.
S"u pra, n. 16, 160.
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As an indication of its policy on the definition of the
word "child," the General Assembly of the Maryland Legis-
lature in 1937 provided that:
"The word child or its equivalent shall be construed
to include any illegitimate child, except in matters of
inheritance, descent or distribution of real and per-
sonal property, unless such a construction would be
unreasonable."
20
The specific exception in matters of inheritance, descent
or distribution seems to preclude the courts from expand-
ing the definition of "child" to include illegitimate children
in such statutes, even though there seemed to be no
tendency on the part of the Court of Appeals to do so prior
to the legislative clarification.
An illegitimate child can become legitimate only if
the father subsequently marries the mother and acknowl-
edeges the child as his own.21 He is thereby made capable
of inheriting and transmitting inheritance as if born in
lawful wedlock. If for any reason the parents never
marry, the child remains illegitimate and has no right to
inherit from his father or other paternal relatives.22 This
conclusion is non sequitur when viewed in relation to the
reasons advanced for the position. The first reason, i.e.,
the uncertainty of paternity and resultant fear of fraudu-
lent claims, seems illogical since paternity involves nothing
more than a question of proof.23 Besides, disinheritance
by will can be resorted to in all jurisdictions except
Louisiana.24 The second reason, i.e., inflicting a penalty
for the wrong done, the indulgence in illicit sexual inter-
course, has the effect of punishing the innocent child, but
not the erring parents.2" The father and paternal relatives
cannot inherit from an illegitimate as he is the "son of
nobody.'26
°MD. LAWS (1937), Ch. 74; Rowe v. Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 363, 9 A. 2d
5S5 (1939).
214 Mo. CODE (1957) Art. 46, § 6.
2 Ibid. "This section sets out the only right of inheritance from the
father given an illegitimate child by Maryland Statutes." The annotation
cites Scott v. Independent Ice Co., 135 Md. 343, 109 A. 117 (1919), but
as pointed out in the principal case on page 160 the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law was amended in 1920 to allow the illegitimate children who are
dependent to recover Workmen's Compensation for the accidental death of
their putative father.
27 C.J. 959; Trout v. Burnett, 99 S.C. 276, 83 S.E. 684 (1914).
"ATKINSON, WrLLs (2nd ed. 1953) 138.
Note, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimates, 84 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 531, 5.38 (1936) ; In Re Vincent's Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 71 N.Y.S.
2d 165 (1947).
mNote, Inheritance By, From and Through Illegitimates. ibid. In a few
states the legislatures have stipulated that the father may succeed his
1960]
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The Maryland Legislature has gone much further in
relaxing the Common Law disabilities of inheritance by
and from the mother and maternal relatives of the ille-
gitimate. The Legislature in 182527 provided for inher-
itance of both real and personal property by illegitimate
children and their descendants from their mother, or from
each other, or from the descendants of each other, as the
case may be, in like manner as if born in lawful wedlock.
The Court was presented in Miller et al. v. Stewart et al.8
with the converse of the situation provided for by this
statute. In deciding that the surviving mother and her
three legitimate children could not inherit from an ille-
gitimate son who died intestate and without issue, the
Court indicated that thp Act of 1845, Chapter 120, only re-
moved the disqualification so as to enable an illegitimate
to inherit from the mother and from other illegitimate
brothers and sisters. There was no reciprocity intended
between the legitimate and illegitimate, and the Act recog-
nized no relationship between them as brother and sister.
The illegitimate was still in contemplation of the statute
nullius filius except as to those situations specifically set
forth therein. The Court referred in its opinion to the unre-
ported case of Medcalf v. Daley and Jones,29 which proved
to be a direct precedent for the holding in the principal
case, i.e., that an illegitimate child cannot inherit from a
legitimate brother.
However, in Barron v. Zimmerman,0 the Court allowed
an illegitimate child to inherit by representation from his
deceased mother's sister, reasoning that:
it **one who is in the position of a lawful begotten
child for the purpose of inheriting from his mother
should be regarded as a 'child' of the mother, within
the intent of the law, for the purpose of succeeding to
the estate which she would have inherited if she would
have survived."31
When a party takes by representation, the size of the share
alone is determined by what the deceased parent's share
would have been had he survived, but the right to inherit
vests directly in the claimant; who in effect is taking in
place of the deceased parent and not through him. It
illegitimate child if there has been mutual recognition or acknowledgment
by the father of the relationship.
2MD. LAWS (1825), Ch. 156; Penman v. Ayers, 221 Md. 154, 156, 156 A.
2d 638 (1959).
-8 Gill 129 (Md. 1849).
-Ibid., 133.
M117 Md. 296, 83 A. 258 (1912).
SIbid., 300.
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would therefore seem that the Court intended to place
the illegitimate child in the bloodstream of his mother for
purposes of inheritance even though the taking was by
representation and not in his own right.
As pointed out earlier, the Act of 1825, Chapter 15632 pro-
vided for inheritance of both real and personal property by
illegitimate children and their descendants from their
mother, or from each other, or from the descendants of
each other, as the case may be, in like manner as if born in
lawful wedlock. In 1868,11 the phrase "as if born in lawful
wedlock" was deleted and it was further provided that if
the illegitimate die without descendants, brothers, or sis-
ters, or their descendants, his mother, if living, and her
heirs at law, if she be dead, should inherit from the illegiti-
mate in the same manner as if such illegitimate child had
been born in lawful wedlock. The appellant in the princi-
ple case contended that, since the above statute allowed
the legitimate to inherit from the illegitimate, by recipro-
city the illegitimate child should be allowed to inherit from
his legitimate half-brother. The Court was quick to point
out that the legislature had not undertaken a wholesale
removal of the Common Law obstacles to inheritance. The
Court of Appeals has adopted and continues to adhere to
strict rules of statutory construction to the effect that Com-
mon Law disabilities of illegitimates are to be removed
only to the extent that the legislature has seen fit.34 It,
therefore, seems clear that if any further relaxation is to
come about in Maryland, it will have to be the result of
remedial legislation. However, a contrary position is taken
by the courts in a majority of the American states. Those
states generally apply liberal rules of construction reason-
ing that the preferable rule of construction is that the stat-
ute be construed as broadly as possible in order to remedy
a gross and manifest injustice of the Common Law.3 5
In summation, Maryland allows the illegitimate to in-
herit from (1) his mother, her other illegitimate children,
Supra, n. 27. 156.
MD. LAWS (1868), Ch. 199; ibid., 159. Other than minor changes in text
and punctuation In 1888, the Act. of 1868 has continued unchanged and is
now 4 Mb. Conn (1957) Art. 46, § 7.
11 McKeon v. State, Use of Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 443, 127 A. 2d 635 (1956).
defines strict construction to mean that a statute will not be construed
beyond its natural meaning as the primary purpose In construing and
interpreting a statute Is to ascertain and to carry out the true Intention
of the legislature.
In Re Klingaman's Estate, 128 A. 2d 311 (Del. 1957). See also Morin
v. Holliday, 39 Ind. App. 201, 77 N.E. 861 (1906); Matter of Hoagland's
Estate, 125 Misc. 376, 211 N.Y.S. 629 (1925); Goodman v. Goodman, 150
Va. 42, 142 S.E. 412 (1928).
1960]
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and their descendants; (2) his lineal and collateral ma-
ternal relatives by representation; and (3) his natural
parents and everyone in their bloodstream on the con-
tingency that the father subsequently marries and ac-
knowledges the illegitimate as his own. The following
parties are allowed to inherit from the illegitimate:
(1) his mother or her heirs at law, including legiti-
mate children, if she be dead, providing the illegitimate
has died without issue or collateral heirs, i.e., other
illegitimates and their descendants; (2) other illegitimates
of the same mother and their descendants.
The real question is how far the legislature in each
particular jurisdiction should go in the removal of the
Common Law disabilities on inheritance by and from
bastards? There seems no valid reason for cutting off his
rights of inheritance at the mother, or maternal relatives,
or at the father if he subsequently marries the child's
mother and acknowledges the child as his own. This
writer recommends that they be completely removed and
the illegitimate child, for purposes of inheritance, be
placed in the bloodstream of his natural parents. All re-
cent legislation tends in this direction, but few states have
been willing to go this far. The erring parents could still
protect their estates since in all jurisdictions but
Louisiana they possess a complete right to disinherit even
legitimate children by testamentary disposition.
The real evil is the illicit intercourse of the parents, not
the birth of the bastard. The doctrine of nullius filius pun-
ishes the only innocent party to the whole affair, and the
placing of a stigma on him has certainly had small de-
terrent effect on illegitimacy. Any punitive measures
should in fairness fall upon the wrongdoing parents, not
the illegitimate. DxNIEL W. MOYLAN
Sufficiency Of Description In A
Chattel Mortgage
Phillips v. J. F. Johnson Lumber Company'
In August 1955, one Glover executed and recorded a
chattel mortgage to the appellee, Johnson, covering several
passenger motor vehicles and motor trucks, as well as
sundry equipment, including the subject of the present
suit, "l-Terratrac Bulldozer loader - Model 30", the only
such piece of equipment which Glover owned. All of the
1218 Md. 531, 147 A. 2d 843 (1959).
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